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THE BANKRUPTCY SHADOW: SECTION 525(B) AND THE 
JOB APPLICANT’S SISYPHEAN STRUGGLE FOR A FRESH 
START 
ABSTRACT 
Congress amended § 525 of the Bankruptcy Code in 1984 to expand 
employment discrimination regulation to private employers. Section 525 
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of bankruptcy status. Section 
525(a) prohibits this practice by government employers, and § 525(b) does so 
with respect to private employers. But there is a key difference between the 
two sections: only § 525(a), which governs public employers, explicitly 
prohibits discriminatory hiring on the basis of bankruptcy status. 
Courts have split over whether a similar prohibition protecting private 
employees from discriminatory hiring should be read into § 525(b). This 
Comment argues that by narrowly interpreting § 525(b) as omitting such a 
prohibition, courts are dishonoring an overarching goal of bankruptcy law: to 
provide debtors with a fresh start. This Comment supports its position in 
several ways. First, credit reports—the source of information about 
individuals’ bankruptcy status—are unreliable, unfair, and difficult to remedy. 
Second, the history of § 525(b) shows that permitting private employers to use 
bankruptcy status as a hiring criterion leads to unreasonable and unnecessarily 
punitive results that were outside the goals of the enacting legislators. Third, 
enacted state statutes and proposed federal legislation identify, address, and 
attempt to remedy this very problem. 
Ultimately, because bankrupt debtors deserve both a fresh start and 
protection against discriminatory hiring, § 525(b) should be amended to 
prohibit private employers from hiring discrimination on the basis of 
bankruptcy status. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the pillars of bankruptcy is providing the debtor with “a fresh start 
in life,”1 a “new opportunity,”2 and “a clear field for future effort.”3 
 
 1 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
 2 Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918).  
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Problematically, employers who request credit reports as part of the job 
application process are increasingly disrupting this “fresh start.” When credit 
reports reveal job applicants’ past bankruptcies, employers often disqualify the 
applicants without considering what gave rise to the bankruptcies or the 
applicants’ pertinent credentials. This knee-jerk reaction by employers creates 
a bankruptcy shadow: job applicants who filed for bankruptcy after falling 
victim to a bad economy or other unfortunate circumstances are categorically 
prevented from obtaining employment. The bankruptcy shadow makes jobs 
harder to find for those who need them the most. Thus, the Bankruptcy Code’s 
fresh start is merely theoretical for a wide swath of debtors. Those looking for 
their fresh start are forced, like the mythological king Sisyphus, to endure the 
interminable and repetitive toil of job application after job application with no 
positive result. 
This toil is exemplified by Eric Myers, a North Carolina native, who filed 
for chapter 7 bankruptcy relief in 2008.4 A month after Myers filed for 
bankruptcy, he moved from North Carolina to Florida in pursuit of a “fresh 
start.”5 In Florida, Myers managed to find work at a Starbucks coffeehouse as a 
shift supervisor.6 The bankruptcy court discharged Myers’ debt.7 While 
working at Starbucks, Myers saw an advertisement for a management position 
at a nearby TooJay’s restaurant.8 Myers met with the regional manager of 
TooJay’s, and after a two-day on-the-job assessment he was scheduled to begin 
working at TooJay’s.9 Myers gave Starbucks his two weeks’ notice.10 
However, Myers was never informed that a pristine credit history would be a 
prerequisite to gain full-time employment with TooJay’s.11 
A month later, before Myers was scheduled to start work, he received a 
letter from TooJay’s indicating that his employment offer had been rescinded 
due to information revealed in his consumer credit report.12 Myers contacted 
TooJay’s Human Resources Department to obtain further explanation about 
 
 3 Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904). 
 4 Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 1280–81. 
 10 Id. at 1281. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. at 1282. 
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why his offer was rescinded.13 TooJay’s explained that its policy forbids hiring 
individuals who have filed for bankruptcy.14 In short, Myers could not get a job 
at the restaurant because he had filed for bankruptcy relief in 2008.15 Myers 
wrote a letter to the CEO requesting that TooJay’s reconsider its policy.16 
Myers never received a response to his letter, but instead returned to Starbucks, 
where he was forced to accept reduced hours.17 Myers filed suit against 
TooJay’s alleging employment discrimination.18 Because TooJay’s is a private 
employer and Myers’ employment never officially began, the Bankruptcy 
Code could not provide him with protection or compensation.19 
Myers did not realize that his past bankruptcy would trail him like a 
shadow. Instead, he put his faith in a promise made by the American consumer 
bankruptcy system for a “fresh start.” The underlying purpose of the fresh start 
is to encourage recovering and former debtors to participate in the American 
economy so that they may have a chance at a prosperous financial future.20 The 
concept of a fresh start is omnipresent in the world of bankruptcy, yet the 
meaning of the term is not fully understood.21 Because “fresh start” has such 
an elusive meaning, it is often supplemented with the rhetoric of rehabilitation 
by commentators.22 
Rehabilitation, in its most distilled form, means that the debtor will be “free 
of financial hardship” after she files for bankruptcy.23 Professor Margaret 
Howard explained that within the concept of rehabilitation there is a policy 
thread of economic rehabilitation.24 However, post-bankruptcy economic 
rehabilitation may be impossible when private employers use adverse credit 
reports to disqualify job applicants.25 Adverse credit reports are treated like a 
 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 1281–82. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 1282. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. at 1280, 1282. 
 19 See 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (2006). 
 20 Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 
67, 68–69 (2006). 
 21 Id. at 68. 
 22 See, e.g., id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1060–62 
(1987). 
 25 Id. Credit reports are not the only way to discover whether a job applicant has filed for bankruptcy, it 
is just the most prevalent. An employer can also look at the Federal District record system where the job 
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scarlet letter for those who hoped the bankruptcy system would provide them 
with a “fresh start.”26 The bankruptcy system gave Myers the impression that, 
if he qualified for and complied with the chapter 7 provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code, he would have a clean slate and the opportunity to better his 
circumstances.27 Instead, he is burdened by the shadow of his former 
bankruptcy filing. 
In Part I, this Comment examines protective mechanisms in the Bankruptcy 
Code and the Fair Credit Reporting Act for bankrupt debtors. This Comment 
demonstrates that these mechanisms do not adequately prevent employment 
discrimination in the bankruptcy context. In Part II, this Comment examines 
the majority of courts’ narrow interpretation of 11 U.S.C. § 525(b). In Part II, 
this Comment also describes an extreme minority of courts that have tried to 
skirt the plain meaning of the text to harmonize its interpretation with the fresh 
start theory of bankruptcy. In Part III, this Comment argues that reform is 
needed because employers’ use of credit checks leads to unfair and 
unnecessarily punitive results. In Part IV, this Comment explores both 
proposed and enacted state and federal legislation that aims to remedy 
employment discrimination in this context. This Comment concludes by 
arguing that the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to better protect job 
applicants who have filed for bankruptcy. 
I. BACKGROUND 
To gain context, it is important to first examine § 525(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). These two laws attempt to 
limit employment discrimination against debtors. They are the primary statutes 
used by courts to determine whether Congress permitted employment 
discrimination against bankrupt debtors. First, this Comment addresses 
§ 525(b). This Comment reviews the circumstances prompting the enactment 
of the statute, surveys the discrepancies in the interpretation of § 525(b), and 
outlines the reasons why the majority interpretation provides inadequate 
protection. Second, this Comment assesses the FCRA’s deficiency in limiting 
the abuse of credit reports in the employment context. A critical examination 
 
applicant resides. The record system is called PACER and is available to the public. See generally PUBLIC 
ACCESS TO COURT ELECTRONIC RECORDS, http://www.pacer.gov (last visited Mar. 28, 2013). 
 26 Michael R. Herz, The Scarlet D: Bankruptcy Filing and Employment Discrimination, 30 AM. BANKR. 
INST. L.J., Apr. 2011, at 16, 89–90. 
 27 See Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1280 (11th Cir. 2011). 
OROVITZ GALLEYS3 8/1/2013 2:53 PM 
2013] THE BANKRUPTCY SHADOW 557 
of § 525(b) and the FCRA supports the argument that to give all debtors a 
“fresh start,” Congress must amend § 525(b). 
A. Section 525(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 
In contrast to § 525(a), which applies to government employers, § 525(b) is 
directed at private employers.28 Section 525 of the Bankruptcy Code is the 
primary statute that protects bankrupt debtors from employment 
discrimination.29 Subsection (b) prevents private employers from terminating 
employees based on bankruptcy status.30 However, unlike § 525(a), § 525(b) 
does not specify that a private employer cannot “deny employment to” a job 
applicant because she was once a bankrupt debtor.31 The two sections’ 
disparate language has generated a split in the courts as to whether private 
employers can deny employment to job applicants solely because their credit 
histories reveal a past bankruptcy.32 Below, this Comment discusses the history 
preceding the enactment of § 525(b) to demonstrate that the majority 
interpretation does not satisfy Congress’s goals. 
1. History of 11 U.S.C. § 525 
In 1978, Congress enacted § 525 of the Bankruptcy Code in reaction to the 
Supreme Court’s Perez v. Campbell decision.33 In Perez, the Court was 
dissatisfied with the protection afforded to a debtor who filed for bankruptcy.34 
Specifically, in its opinion, the Court expressed that it disliked how a third 
party’s action could interfere with a debtor benefiting from the bankruptcy 
process.35 In the years following the enactment of § 525, courts filled in the 
statutory gaps and manipulated the statute,36 but stopped short of applying it to 
 
 28 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2006), with id. § 525(b). 
 29 Id. § 525(b). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Compare id. § 525(a), with id. § 525(b). 
 32 See, e.g., Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 116 
(2011); Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 33 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5867 (citing Perez v. 
Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (holding that a state would frustrate the congressional policy of a fresh start if 
it were permitted to refuse to renew a drivers license because the driver did not pay a judgment that was 
discharged in bankruptcy)); David L. Zeiler, Section 525(b): Anti-Discrimination Protection for 
Employees/Debtors in the Private Sector—Is it Illusion or Reality?, 101 COM. L.J. 152, 152 & n.2 (1996). 
 34 See Perez, 402 U.S. at 654. 
 35 See id. 
 36 See Zeiler, supra note 33, at 157 (“Conduct [the courts] deemed to warrant debtor protection includes: 
withholding college transcripts by public institutions, excluding bankrupt debtors from student loan guarantee 
programs, refusing participation in the contract bidding process by governmental entities, refusing to grant 
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debtors who suffer discrimination at the hands of private employers.37 Courts 
have explained that the language of § 525 prevents them from interpreting the 
statute in a way that punishes private employers’ discriminatory hiring.38 For 
instance, in one case, the Eleventh Circuit did not condone private entities’ 
discriminatory actions, but explained that it would be improper to replace the 
court’s policy opinions with the legislation passed by Congress.39 
Congress responded to the courts’ disapproval of the limitations of § 525 
by amending the statute in 1984. The original provision states: 
[A] governmental unit may not deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to 
renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other similar grant to, 
conditions such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant 
against, deny employment to, terminate the employment of, or 
discriminate with respect to employment against, a person that is or 
has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or a debtor under the 
Bankruptcy Act, or another person with whom such bankrupt or 
debtor has been associated, solely because such bankrupt or debtor is 
or has been a debtor under this title or a bankrupt or debtor under the 
Bankruptcy Act, has been insolvent before the commencement of the 
case under this title, or during the case but before the debtor is 
granted or denied a discharge, or has not paid a debt that is 
dischargeable in the case under this title or that was discharged under 
the Bankruptcy Act.40 
This amendment numbered the original provision from the 1978 Bankruptcy 
Reform Act as subsection (a) and the new provision as subsection (b). 
Subsection (b) provides: 
No private employer may terminate the employment of, or 
discriminate with respect to employment against, an individual who 
is or has been a debtor under this title, a debtor or bankrupt under the 
 
state licensure, evicting a discharged debtor from municipal housing, and participating in governmental home 
mortgage finance programs.”). 
 37 Id. 
 38 See Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 2011); Myers v. TooJay’s 
Mgmt. Corp., 419 B.R. 51, 58 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 640 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2011); Stinson v. BB&T Inv. 
Servs., Inc. (In re Stinson), 285 B.R. 239, 248 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002); see also Kungys v. United States, 485 
U.S. 759, 778 (1988) (“[T]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation [is] that no provision should be construed 
to be entirely redundant.”). 
 39 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (2006); Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 52 (2008)); see, e.g., Barbee v. First 
Va. Bank-Colonial (In re Barbee), 14 B.R. 733, 736 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981). 
 40 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (emphasis added). 
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Bankruptcy Act, or an individual associated with such debtor or 
bankrupt, solely because such debtor or bankrupt— 
(1) is or has been a debtor under this title or a debtor or 
bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act; 
(2) has been insolvent before the commencement of a case 
under this title or during the case but before the grant or denial 
of a discharge; or 
(3) has not paid a debt that is dischargeable in a case under this 
title or that was discharged under the Bankruptcy Act.41 
Section 525(b) essentially prevents private employers from discriminating 
against debtors who filed for bankruptcy if certain conditions are met. 
When Congress enacted § 525(b), legal scholars lauded it as a 
strengthening of existing bankruptcy policies.42 They explained that extending 
the protection afforded against government employers to private employers 
would promote rehabilitation and provide a fresh start for debtors.43 While 
these scholars recognized that interpreting courts would inevitably shape the 
new law, one bankruptcy attorney confidently wrote in the American 
Bankruptcy Law Journal that § 525(b) “does protect an employee from 
terminations or other actions, the effect of which would interfere with the 
‘fresh start’ policy of the bankruptcy laws.”44 This understanding of § 525(b) 
would turn out to be overly optimistic because courts would interpret this new 
provision to provide limited protection to the “honest but unfortunate 
debtor.”45 
2. Judicial Interpretation of § 525(b) 
Courts are split on how to interpret § 525(b) in light of § 525(a), which 
does not allow a government employer to deny employment to an applicant 
who has filed for bankruptcy.46 Most courts that have considered § 525(b) have 
decided that the statute does not bar a private employer from discriminating 
against applicants who have filed for bankruptcy, while a minority of courts 
 
 41 Id. 
 42 Zeiler, supra note 33, at 153; see also Douglas G. Boshkoff, Private Parties and Bankruptcy-Based 
Discrimination, 62 IND. L.J. 159 (1987); John C. Chobot, Anti-Discrimination Under the Bankruptcy Laws, 60 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 185 (1986); Andrew N. Herbach, Debtor’s Protection from Private Employer’s 
Discrimination, WIS. B. BULL., Oct. 1988, at 21. 
 43 See, e.g., Zeiler, supra note 33, at 153; Boshkoff, supra note 42; Chobot, supra note 42; Herbach, 
supra note 42. 
 44 Chobot, supra note 42, at 201. 
 45 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934). 
 46 Herz, supra note 26, at 18.  
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have decided that the statute should be interpreted to protect private job 
applicants.47 Because § 525(b)’s language does not explicitly prevent a private 
employer from denying employment to an individual who has filed for 
bankruptcy, courts must speculate as to whether subsection (b) protects job 
applicants.48 Courts are left to deduce whether § 525(b)’s omission of “deny 
employment to” was a scrivener’s error or evidence that Congress intended for 
private employers to be subjected to less stringent standards than government 
employers.49 Unfortunately, the legislative history is vague and confusing.50 
B. Fair Credit Reporting Act 
The FCRA is another law that ineffectively limits employment 
discrimination. Congress enacted the FCRA to curtail abusive practices by 
credit-reporting agencies and those who subscribe to these the reports.51 The 
primary function of these agencies is to produce consumer credit reports for 
third-party lenders that reflect individuals’ creditworthiness.52 There are three 
main credit-reporting agencies in the United States: Experian, Equifax, and 
TransUnion.53 These credit-reporting agencies must comply with the FCRA. 
The FCRA has been criticized for not shielding consumers from employers 
who use these reports to punish job applicants who have filed for bankruptcy.54 
Credit reports are widely used by employers because they believe that job 
applicants with fewer payment delinquencies and better credit scores are less 
likely to steal and more likely to be valuable workers.55 Below, this Comment 
 
 47 See infra Part II. 
 48 Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“We are asked to infer from this omission 
not only that it was purposeful to achieve a disparate result where the Government is the employer, but that 
§ 525(b) accordingly allows employers to discriminate on the initial hiring against those unfortunate economic 
casualties who are seeking or have obtained a fresh start from the bankruptcy court, and yet at the same time 
prohibits discrimination against those who have been hired.”). 
 49 See Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing the Leary court’s opinion 
that § 525(b) contains a scrivener’s error and ultimately rejecting this interpretation), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
116 (2011). 
 50 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 367 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6322–23.  
 51 Kelly Gallagher, Comment, Rethinking the Fair Credit Reporting Act: When Requesting Credit 
Reports for “Employment Purposes” Goes Too Far, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1593, 1595 (2006).  
 52 Experian (formerly TRW), Equifax, and TransUnion dominate the multibillion-dollar credit industry 
where they have reports on almost every single adult American and add over 24 billion pieces of information 
to their reports each year. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 
13 (6th ed. 2009).  
 53 Id. 
 54 Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1595.  
 55 Id.  
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will explore the effect of the FCRA on credit reporting agencies and 
employers. 
1. Credit Reporting Agency Abuse of Credit Reports 
A credit score is designed to be a snapshot of an individual’s current 
financial health.56 The FCRA defines consumer credit reports as 
any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a 
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit 
worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general 
reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living which is used 
or expected to be used or collected in whole or in part for the purpose 
of serving as a factor in establishing a consumer’s eligibility for – (A) 
credit or insurance to be used primarily for personal, family, or 
household purposes; (B) employment purposes; or (C) any other 
purpose authorized under section 1681b of this title.57 
Simply put, a credit report is any type of statement created by a consumer-
reporting agency that has been used to determine a consumer’s eligibility for 
credit, insurance, or a job. The FCRA mandates that credit reporting agencies 
use “reasonable procedures” to guarantee the accuracy of the information 
found within a credit report. The majority of courts subscribe to the “maximum 
possible accuracy” standard, which holds credit reporting agencies liable for 
“reports containing factually incorrect information that . . . mislead their 
readers.”58 But, there are many courts that only require that credit reports be 
“technically accurate.”59 This less stringent standard allows for credit reporting 
agencies to report information that may be misleading or deficient.60 For 
example, if a father files for bankruptcy after co-signing a car lease with his 
daughter, it is “technically accurate” to include the bankruptcy on her credit 
report.61 This is misleading because the daughter’s credit report will indicate 
that she filed for bankruptcy when, in actuality, it was her father who filed for 
bankruptcy. 
 
 56 The score range used by the three main credit-reporting agencies is from a bad score of 300 to a 
perfect score of 850, and it reflects the types of credit in use, payment history, amount owed, length of credit 
history, and new credit. FAIR ISAAC CORP., UNDERSTANDING YOUR FICO SCORE 3 (2011), http://www.myfico. 
com/Downloads/Files/myFICO_UYFS_Booklet.pdf. 
 57 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(d)(1) (2006).  
 58 Neal v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., No. 8:02CV378, 2004 WL 628214, at *3 (D. Neb. Mar. 30, 2004). 
 59 Henson v. CSC Credit Servs., 29 F.3d 280, 283 (7th Cir. 1994); Neal, 2004 WL 628214, at *3; Todd v. 
Associated Credit Bureau Servs., Inc. 451 F. Supp. 447, 448 (E.D. Pa.1977). 
 60 Neal, 2004 WL 628214, at *3. 
 61 See, e.g., id. at *3–4. 
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Despite most courts’ expectations that credit reporting agencies maintain 
“maximum possible accuracy,” a 2004 study by the Public Interest Research 
Group found that seventy-nine percent of credit reports contained errors.62 This 
statistic raises the question of whether credit reports should be used as a 
barometer of job success and whether the FCRA is effective in protecting 
consumers. Moreover, the statistic also demonstrates job applicants’ 
vulnerability, as the broad language of the FCRA allows for nearly unrestricted 
use of consumer credit reports for “employment purposes.”63 Employers are 
unrestricted in their use of inaccurate credit reports to deny individuals 
employment.64 This unfettered power is inherently unfair because it not only 
denies bankrupt debtors a “fresh start,” but it also punishes applicants who are 
not bankrupt debtors but who are listed as such on their credit reports. 
2. Employer Abuse of Credit Reports 
Employers that wish to obtain a job applicant’s credit report must procure 
written authorization from the applicant.65 If an employer takes adverse action 
against an applicant because of information in her credit report, the FCRA 
requires two additional transparency measures.66 First, the employer must 
furnish the applicant with a copy of her credit report.67 Second, the employer 
must inform the applicant that information found in her credit report was 
detrimental to her application.68 This second measure is important because, in 
theory, it gives an individual the information she needs to be proactive in 
remedying any inaccuracies in her credit report. This Comment will address 
why this unfortunately does not work in practice.69 
The credit report that an employer receives includes bankruptcy records.70 
This information may be a factor in employers’ decisions to employ the 
applicant. Employers feel justified to use credit reports as an evaluative tool 
 
 62 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 52, at 13. 
 63 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(B) (2006). 
 64 See EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d 619, 624 (N.D. Ohio 2011). 
 65 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A)(ii).  
 66 Id. § 1681b(b)(3)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See infra Part III.A.1.b. 
 70 Credit Reports and Credit Scores, FEDERALRESERVE.GOV (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/creditreports/default.htm.  
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because they believe credit reflects a potential job candidate’s qualifications.71 
Sixty percent of employers use credit checks in pre-employment screenings for 
at least some job applicants.72 Yet, there are no studies supporting a correlation 
between a person’s credit and her job performance.73 In fact, a TransUnion 
Credit Bureau official stated under oath that there is no “research to show any 
statistical correlation between what’s in somebody’s credit report and their job 
performance or their likelihood to commit fraud.”74 If credit reporting agencies 
cannot provide empirical support to justify employer reliance on their product, 
employers should be prohibited from using them to make hiring decisions. 
In Part II, this Comment will address how courts have interpreted § 525(b). 
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION OF § 525(B) 
Courts are currently split on how to interpret § 525(b) in light of § 525(a). 
According to a majority of courts, a plain reading of § 525(b) reveals 
Congress’s purposeful omission of the expansive protection afforded to private 
job applicants under § 525(a).75 These courts hold that subsection (b) should be 
interpreted as not affording private job applicants the same anti-discriminatory 
rights as individuals who are applying for government jobs.76 For example, 
under the majority interpretation, an individual who filed for chapter 7 
bankruptcy five years prior to applying for a job cannot be discriminated 
against solely for that reason if he is applying for a position with the post 
office, but he can be discriminated against if he is applying for a job with 
FedEx or UPS.77 
A minority of courts takes the position that the language of § 525(b) is 
broad enough to extend protections to discriminatory hiring by private 
employers.78 These courts believe that they “should not go out of [their] way to 
place such an absurd gloss on a remedial statute, simply because the scrivener 
 
 71 See Background Checking: Conducting Credit Background Checks SHRM Poll, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN 
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Articles/Pages/ 
BackgroundChecking.aspx.  
 72 Id. 
 73 See Andrew Martin, As a Hiring Filter Credit Checks Draw Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2010 
(quoting Eric Rosenberg of TransUnion Credit Bureau). 
 74 See id. 
 75 See, e.g., Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 940 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 116 
(2011). 
 76 See id. at 940–41. 
 77 See 11 U.S.C. § 525(a)–(b) (2006). 
 78 See Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
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was more verbose in writing § 525(a).”79 Instead, the minority view claims that 
subsection (a)’s inclusion of “discriminate with respect to employment against 
an individual who . . . has been a debtor” is broad enough to encompass 
employment discrimination in the private employer context.80 The majority of 
courts maintain that this language is not explicit enough to have such a broad 
meaning.81 In response, the minority view claims that the evil being legislated 
against is the same whether an individual is being discriminated against during 
her employment with a private entity or discriminated against during the hiring 
process.82 For example, an individual who works for FedEx or UPS cannot be 
fired because his employer discovers that he filed for bankruptcy, but he can be 
removed from the applicant pool because of this filing.83 Such arbitrary 
distinctions make little sense and will be discussed below. This Comment will 
look to how courts of appeals have decided § 525(b) cases, and then address a 
minority court that has interpreted the statute differently. 
A. Majority View and the Courts of Appeals’ Consensus 
In 2010, the Third Circuit adopted the majority’s position in Rea v. 
Federated Investors.84 In 2011, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits followed suit.85 
These are the only courts of appeals that have addressed the scope of § 525(b). 
Thus, all of the circuit courts that have interpreted § 525(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code have concluded that the statute does not preclude private employers from 
engaging in discriminatory hiring.86 There are two main reasons why this 
conclusion is appealing: (1) it purports to discern the plain meaning of the 
statute; and (2) when the two subsections of the statute are read in pari 
materia, through a direct comparison, a court’s more narrow interpretation is 
easily defensible. Each of these points will be explained in turn. 
 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id.  
 81 11 U.S.C. § 525(b).  
 82 Leary, 251 B.R. at 658. 
 83 See generally 11 U.S.C. § 525(b). 
 84 Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 938 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 116 (2011). 
 85 See Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2011); Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In 
re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 86 See, e.g., Myers, 640 F.3d at 1278; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 169; Rea, 627 F.3d at 937; Stinson v. 
BB&T Inv. Servs., Inc. (In re Stinson), 285 B.R. 239 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002); Fiorani v. CACI, 192 B.R. 401 
(E.D. Va. 1996); Pastore v. Medford Sav. Bank, 186 B.R. 553 (D. Mass. 1995); Madison Madison Int’l of Ill., 
P.C. v. Matra, S.A. (In re Madison Int’l of Ill., P.C.), 77 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1987). Contra In re 
Hopkins, 81 B.R. 491 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1987).  
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1. “Plain Meaning” Interpretation 
The Supreme Court frequently endorses a “plain meaning” interpretation of 
a statute because the words used in a particular statute are the most persuasive 
evidence of the legislature’s intent.87 The Third Circuit’s opinion in Rea v. 
Federated Investors is illustrative of the majority’s plain meaning 
interpretation of § 525(b). The Third Circuit held that the phrase 
“discrimination with respect to employment” should not be read broadly to 
encompass hiring.88 The facts in Rea are typical of hiring discrimination cases 
arising under § 525(b). In Rea, Dean Rea filed for bankruptcy and his debts 
were discharged.89 Six years later, he applied for a project manager job with 
Federated Investors, but the offer was contingent on a check of his credit 
history.90 Rea authorized the checks, and it revealed his past bankruptcy.91 The 
bankruptcy was a “deal killer”; the job offer was withdrawn.92 
Rea then sued, claiming that the employer had engaged in unlawful 
employment discrimination when the firm refused to hire him because of his 
past bankruptcy.93 The employer moved to dismiss Rea’s action and argued 
that § 525(b) is not applicable to situations in which private employers refuse 
to hire an individual because that individual has filed for bankruptcy.94 The 
employer claimed that the plain meaning of § 525(b) did not specifically 
include “hiring” in its list of actions that should be considered employment 
discrimination against a bankrupt debtor.95 
However, the text of § 525(b) does not explicitly exclude “hiring.”96 
Arguably, Congress meant for the phrase “[n]o private employer . . . may 
 
 87 United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940). 
 88 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (2006); Rea, 627 F.3d at 940–41. Lower courts have similarly held that the phrase 
“discriminate with respect to employment” should not be a catchall phrase calculated to encompass all 
particulars of employment. Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 431 B.R. 894, 899–900 (S.D. Tex. 
2010), aff’d, 635 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2011).  
 89 Rea, 627 F.3d at 938. 
 90 Rea v. Federated Investors, 431 B.R. 18, 20 (W.D. Pa. 2010), aff’d, 627 F.3d 937 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 116 (2011). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See 11 U.S.C. § 525(b); Linda Coady, Private Employer May Refuse to Hire Bankrupt Applicant, 
THOMPSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Jan. 23, 2013, 4:55 PM), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/ 
Bankruptcy/Insight/2011/01_-_January/Private_employer_may_refuse_to_hire_bankrupt_applicant/.  
 94 Rea, 627 F.3d at 939 (emphasis added). 
 95 Id. 
 96 See 11 U.S.C. § 525(b). 
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discriminate with respect to employment” to include discriminatory hiring.97 
This, too, would be a reasonable plain meaning interpretation of the statute’s 
text. The minority disputes that the plain meaning interpretation of § 525(b) 
supports the exclusion of hiring discrimination by private employers.98 
The minority argues that the language “with respect to employment” is 
broad enough to encompass discrimination in hiring.99 In Leary v. Warnaco, 
the Southern District Court of New York reasoned that discrimination “with 
respect to employment” embraces, through its plain meaning, all facets of 
employment including “hiring, firing and material changes in job 
conditions.”100 Commentators posit that any interpretation of a statute that 
strictly looks at its plain meaning risks generating a “law without mind.”101 
Instead, some courts, as discussed below, try to read a statute in within the 
context of similar statutes to move beyond a purely plain meaning approach. 
2. In Pari Materia 
The majority counters that interpreting the phrase “with respect to 
employment” to include hiring would make the provisions in § 525(a) and (b) 
redundant and much of the specific language in subsection (a) superfluous.102 
The majority reasons that disparate inclusions and exclusions within two 
subsections should be read in pari materia if the scope and aim of the 
subsections are the same.103 In pari materia is a statutory canon driving the 
legal fiction that where “Congress adopts a new law incorporating sections of a 
prior law, Congress normally can be presumed to have had knowledge of the 
interpretation given to the incorporated law, at least insofar as it affects the 
new statute.”104 In short, without evidence to the contrary, judges are to assume 
that Congress was aware of all other relevant statutes when it was drafting a 
new statute. When interpreting a statute, 
 
 97 Id.; see also Stinson v. BB&T Inv. Servs., Inc. (In re Stinson), 285 B.R. 239, 245 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 
2002). 
 98 Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 99 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 525(b); Leary, 251 B.R. at 658. 
 100 11 U.S.C. § 525(b); Leary, 251 B.R. at 659. 
 101 See generally Steven Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104 (1989). 
 102 11 U.S.C. § 525(a)–(b); Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169, 172–73 (5th Cir. 
2011); Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 419 B.R. 51, 58 (M.D. Fla. 2009); Stinson, 285 B.R. at 248; see 
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 777–78 (1988) (noting that “the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation 
that no provision should be construed to be entirely redundant”).  
 103 See United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465, 468 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 104 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 292 (2d ed. 2006) 
(citing Lorillard v. Pons, 433 U.S. 907 (1977)). 
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the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general 
words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole 
statute . . . and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its 
various provisions, and give to it such a construction as will carry 
into execution the will of the Legislature.105 
Simply put, if there is more than one subsection within a statute, then the two 
will be read side-by-side to fully understand Congress’s intent. If § 525(a) and 
(b) are read in pari materia, the majority of courts construe Congress’s use of 
the same wording in both subsections of the statute with an absence of “deny 
employment to” in subsection (b) as a purposeful omission on the part of 
Congress.106 
The employer argued in Rea for a narrow reading of § 525(b), noting 
“where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that 
Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”107 The majority emphasized that Congress made the language in 
subsection (b) nearly identical to subsection (a) and put the two subsections 
adjacent to each other.108 The Third Circuit concluded that Congress must have 
modeled subsection (b) after subsection (a), and so exclusion of language in 
subsection (b) dealing with hiring was ipso facto deliberate.109 The majority 
also conceded that, if § 525(b) existed in isolation, the implicit inclusion of 
hiring in its list of discriminatory acts would be meritorious.110 
The majority’s position emphasizes that the plain meaning interpretation of 
§ 525(b) does not prohibit discriminating hiring based on bankruptcy.111 The 
Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that § 525(b) should be read in 
pari materia.112 Using this statutory canon, the majority argues that Congress 
meant to exempt private hiring from § 525’s protections from actions that are 
considered discriminatory.113 The minority, on the other hand, argues that it is 
 
 105 Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974). 
 106 Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 419 B.R. 51, 57 (M.D. Fla. 2009). 
 107 Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 939 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 116 (2011) 
(quoting Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983)). 
 108 Id. at 940. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 111 See, e.g., Myers, 640 F.3d at 1283–84; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 172–73; Rea, 627 F.3d at 938. 
 112 See, e.g., Myers, 640 F.3d at 1283–84; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 172–73; Rea, 627 F.3d at 938. 
 113 See, e.g., Myers, 640 F.3d at 1283–84; In re Burnett, 635 F.3d at 172–73; Rea, 627 F.3d at 938. 
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employment discrimination under § 525(b) to deny employment to an 
individual because of a past bankruptcy.114 
B. Minority View as Exemplified in the Leary Case 
The scope and aims of subsections (a) and (b) are alike: both provisions 
protect bankrupt debtors from employment discrimination. It is possible that 
the Bankruptcy Code is purposefully extending less protection to individuals 
applying for private jobs than government positions. But, the minority argues 
that this interpretation does not pass muster when the underlying tenets of 
bankruptcy’s fresh start policy are kept in mind.115 Interpreting a statute with 
the goal of honoring this policy would make the plain meaning just one factor 
in determining the legislative intent behind § 525(b).116 
Section 525(b) does not exist in isolation. It makes sense to consider all 
relevant material when interpreting its provisions. The majority, taking its 
plain meaning stance, comments that Congress’s intentions are instructive for 
interpreting § 525(b).117 In the applicable Senate Report, Congress instructed 
that courts “will continue to mark the contours of the anti-discrimination 
provision in pursuit of sound bankruptcy policy.”118 There is no such 
legislative history for § 525(b), but using the majority’s logic that Congress 
paints with a wide brush, this intention should imbue subsection (b) as well. 
When drafting § 525, Congress was mindful of the tenets of bankruptcy.119 
Perhaps courts should adopt this frame of reference of rehabilitation and a 
fresh start when interpreting statutes from the Bankruptcy Code. 
The bankruptcy court case of Leary v. Warnaco, Inc.120 is the sole case 
representing the minority’s position. Marlene Leary filed and received a 
voluntary discharge under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code.121 About five 
months later Leary interviewed for an executive assistant position.122 The 
employer offered Leary the job subject to a credit check.123 When Leary’s 
 
 114 Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 115 Id. 
 116 Eskridge and his coauthors warn that “if the rule of law requires interpreters to apply statutes to the 
letter, then sometimes the cost of ‘lawfulness’ will be too great.” ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 104, at 233. 
 117 Stinson v. BB&T Inv. Servs., Inc. (In re Stinson), 285 B.R. 239, 247 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002). 
 118 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5867. 
 119 Id. 
 120 251 B.R. 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 121 Id. at 657. 
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
OROVITZ GALLEYS3 8/1/2013 2:53 PM 
2013] THE BANKRUPTCY SHADOW 569 
credit report revealed her past bankruptcy, the company told her it would not 
hire her due to information found within the report.124 Leary filed a complaint 
alleging that by refusing to hire her because of her past bankruptcy, the 
employer violated § 525(b).125 Leary argued for a broader interpretation of 
§ 525(b) that takes into account the fresh start theory and avoids the absurd 
result that would follow from a narrow reading of the statute.126 Here, an 
intertextual argument was applied in the Leary case. An intratextual argument 
supports the majority’s position. Each will be explained in turn. 
1. Intertextual Argument 
In general, it is assumed that Congress uses terms in a consistent manner 
and with a design that each provision contributes to the overall statutory 
scheme. Congress wishes to avoid the situation where a provision is to be 
applied in ways that weaken other provisions.127 The theory employed by all 
federal and state courts is called the “whole act rule” and the premise is that 
Congress enacts legislation as if it did not have a variety of authors, but one 
author throughout Congress’s entire lifespan.128 There are two opposing, yet 
related, arguments for how to interpret a statute holistically—the intertextual 
argument and the intratextual argument. The two arguments are formed under 
the one mind, omniscient author premise. 
Under the intratextual argument, “the preferred meaning of a provision is 
the one consistent with the rest of the statute and statutory scheme.”129 Akin to 
an in pari materia argument,130 the majority uses an intratextual argument to 
support its position that unaccounted for verbiage should not be injected into 
§ 525(b).131 On the other hand, the intertextual argument presupposes that “the 
 
 124 Id. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at 658–59. 
 127 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 104, at 271. “The assumption of a single-minded and omniscient 
legislature is strongly at odds with actual legislative practice, where terms are inserted willy-nilly into the law, 
duplication occurs for reasons of emphasis or even just oversight, and compromises may yield provisions that 
are in tension with one another.” Id. at 271–72. 
 128 Id. at 271. Professor William Buzbee calls this assumption the “one-Congress fiction” where 
“questionable logic illuminates the weak normative and empirical underpinnings of some broader claims about 
textualist modes of interpretation.” William W. Buzbee, The One-Congress Fiction in Statutory Interpretation, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 242 (2000). 
 129 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 104, at 272. 
 130 See supra Part II.A.2. 
 131 Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 419 B.R. 51, 57 (M.D. Fla. 2009), aff’d, 640 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 
2011).  
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preferred meaning of a provision is the one consistent with the rest of the 
code.”132 The minority position provides that § 525(b) should be interpreted 
even more broadly than the majority suggests.133 Instead of merely juxtaposing 
the two subsections of § 525, the statute should be read with the attainment of 
a fresh start in mind. This broader interpretation echoes the familiar rule that “a 
thing may be within the letter of the statute, and yet not within the statute, 
because [it is] not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.”134 
Determining how broadly to interpret a statute from the Bankruptcy Code is 
unambiguous according to this interpretation because rehabilitation and a fresh 
start are always the goal.135 
Interpreting § 525(b) with an emphasis on the policy aims of the 
Bankruptcy Code, in lieu of the plain text enacted by Congress, may be a 
usurpation of Congress’s legislative role.136 The Fifth Circuit likened this 
broader interpretation to looking at a statute with a blurry eye in an attempt to 
find a hidden meaning.137 This comparison is less than apt. Examining a statute 
without consideration of the Bankruptcy Code as a whole is like looking at a 
statute with tunnel vision. It is easier to have a clear view of a statute’s 
subsection when the rest of the Code is used as a frame of reference. 
Otherwise, reading § 525(b) in a vacuum ignores the evils that the Bankruptcy 
Code is trying to resolve. As argued by the minority, a myopic interpretation of 
the Bankruptcy Code may result in an absurd judgment.138 
2. Absurd Result and Scrivener’s Error 
The absurd result canon assumes that Congress does not intend to make 
illogical or unclear instructions for courts to interpret.139 Courts should not 
have to rewrite a statute to avoid an absurd result.140 An absurd result may be 
due to a blunder on the part of the legislature that enacted the statute. The 
Supreme Court has called this type of blunder a scrivener’s error.141 If an 
 
 132 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 104, at 272. 
 133 The Leary court criticizes the majority position for interpreting § 525(b) too narrowly and “drawing a 
negative inference in” by comparing it to subsection (a). Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000).  
 134 Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892). 
 135 See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 81 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5867.  
 136 Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc., 431 B.R. 894, 900 (S.D. Tex 2010), aff’d, 635 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 137 See Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2011). 
 138 Leary, 251 B.R. at 658.  
 139 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 104, at 267. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. at 269. 
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absurd result is deemed to be a scrivener’s error, then the canon as frequently 
applied requires the judiciary to remedy the mistake.142 To detect a scrivener’s 
error it is imperative that a statute be interpreted so as to not only look at the 
plain meaning of the text, but also to take into account the legislative 
deliberation and practical consequences of interpreting the words as they are 
written.143 
In Leary, the court explained, “[t]he evil being legislated against is no 
different when an employer fires a debtor simply for seeking refuge in 
bankruptcy, as contrasted with refusing to hire a person who does so. The 
‘fresh start’ policy is impaired in either case.”144 Further, “[a] Court should not 
go out of its way to place such an absurd gloss on a remedial statute, simply 
because the scrivener was more verbose in writing § 525(a).”145 The Leary 
court reasoned that it is nonsensical to draw an arbitrary line between public 
and private employers where a discriminatory action by one is acceptable but 
not the other.146 The Leary court explained the absence of certain phrases that 
were included in § 525(a) by saying that the scrivener for § 525(b) was simply 
less verbose.147 
The Fifth Circuit addressed this inconsistency and dismissed it as a policy 
argument best delegated to Congress.148 The majority uses the rationale that 
ascribing the difference in the language to a mistake in draftsmanship is 
contrary to overwhelming authority.149 The Third Circuit rejected the argument 
that the varying language in the two subsections is a scrivener’s error.150 In 
Myers v. TooJay’s Management Corporation, the Eleventh Circuit argued that 
just because subsection (b) was enacted by Congress seven years after 
subsection (a) does not mean that any omissions are errors.151 The Eleventh 
Circuit reasoned that Congress’s use of the same language in subsection (b) as 
in subsection (a) is evidence that Congress modeled the former on the latter 
 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 233. 
 144 Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
 145 Id. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169, 173 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 149 Id. 
 150 Rea v. Federated Investors, 627 F.3d 937, 941 (3d Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 116 (2011) 
(“[W]e refrain from concluding here that the differing language in the two subsections has the same meaning 
in each. We would not presume to ascribe this difference to a simple mistake in draftsmanship.” (quoting 
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). 
 151 See Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278, 1284 n.5 (11th Cir. 2011). 
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and, thus, omission of the phrase “deny employment to” from subsection (b) 
was purposeful.152 
Here, the majority argues that Congress’s silence on the issue speaks loud 
and clear.153 It is hard to fault the majority for its unwillingness to interpret 
§ 525(b) beyond what it sees as the plain meaning of the text. Since this view 
is pervasive and courts are loath to overstep their constitutional role, it is 
necessary for Congress to revisit § 525(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and amend 
its language to better advance bankruptcy’s fresh start policy. 
III.  CREDIT CHECKS AS AN EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE LEAD TO UNREASONABLE 
AND PUNITIVE RESULTS 
In this Part, this Comment argues that private employers should not use 
credit report information to screen applicants because doing so leads to 
unreasonable results that are unnecessarily punitive. In particular, there are five 
reasons why the use of credit reports is unreasonable and punitive. First, credit 
reports are ineffective evaluative tools due to their inaccuracies. Credit reports 
are not only unreliable, but their unreliability is difficult to remedy. Second, 
credit reports ignore external factors that lead to bankruptcies. Because of 
issues such as job problems, illness, and family break-up, otherwise-qualified 
job applicants are treated adversely for reasons outside their control when 
employers discriminate against them based on credit history. Third, financial 
responsibility, the ostensible reason for using credit reports in employment, is 
irrelevant to most low-level positions. Fourth, the use of credit reports is 
unreasonable because it may violate the Title VII disparate impact doctrine. 
Lastly, screening out job applicants who file for bankruptcy is unnecessarily 
punitive because it punishes individuals who have already been penalized for 
incurring too much debt. Each of these reasons for why credit reports provide 
little to no value in the employment context is discussed below. 
A. Discrete Yet Harmful Measure154 
It is far too easy to obtain a consumer credit report. Consumer credit 
reporting agencies disclose an individual’s bankruptcy records to an employer 
 
 152 Id. at 1284–85. 
 153 Id. at 1285. 
 154 In this subpart, I define a “discrete yet harmful measure” as a criterion that bears no connection to 
what it is used to prove. 
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if the employer follows the necessary steps to obtain this report.155 While 
employers justify using credit reports because they think it is necessary, many 
employers use this information regardless of its inherent value because it is an 
easy tool to truncate the applicant pool.156 The President of Consumer 
Education at Credit.com explained this best when he said “The recession has 
made this a buyer’s market when it comes to hiring, which may be leading 
more companies to use credit reports as screening criteria.”157 
Other employers truly believe gathering this information is a germane 
practice for gaining insight into an employee’s value, likelihood to steal, or 
money managing skills.158 In testimony to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), an executive member of the National Employment 
Lawyers Association, debunked one of the main reasons for using credit 
reports as an evaluative tool: “There’s no evidence, no science to suggest that 
one’s credit has anything at all to do with propensity to steal.”159 Nonetheless, 
the Society of Human Resource Management found that 35% of employers use 
credit checks to look into the backgrounds of job applicants.160 This is a 
growing practice amongst employers.161 
Despite employers’ increased reliance on credit reports, in reality, this 
practice is a discrete and harmful measure for four reasons. First, credit records 
are laden with inaccuracies that are onerous to correct.162 The information they 
impart may not even depict an individual’s actual credit history, let alone her 
value as an employee. Second, this practice obfuscates the reasons outside of 
 
 155 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a), (b)(3) (2006).  
 156 See Ruth Desmond, Comment, Consumer Credit Reports and Privacy in the Employment Context: The 
Fair Credit Reporting Act and the Equal Employment for All Act, 44 U.S.F. L. REV. 907, 907–08 (2010). 
 157 Pamela Yip, Employers Increasingly Use Applicants’ Credit Histories In Determining Job Future, 
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 21 2009, available at Newspaper Source Accession No. 2W6253277812. 
 158 Adam T. Klein, ReNika Moore & Scott A. Moss, Employer Credit-History Checks and Criminal 
Record Checks of Job Applicants for Hiring Decisions: The Illegality Under the Title VII Disparate Impact 
Doctrine, at The 13th Annual Corporate Counsel Institute, in GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER 
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, 2009 WL 2432291, at *5 (Mar. 12–13, 2009).  
 159 Adam T. Klein, Outten & Golden LLP, Transcript of Testimony at the U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity 
Comm’n, Employment Testing and Screening Meeting (May 16, 2007), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
eeoc/meetings/archive/5-1516-07/transcript.html. 
 160 EVREN ESEN, SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., SHRM WORKPLACE VIOLENCE SURVEY (2004), 
available at http://www.shrm.org/Research/SurveyFindings/Documents/Workplace%20Violence%20Survey. 
pdf. This number is up from the 19% of employers who admitted to using credit checks in 1996. Id. 
 161 See RICHARD C. HOLLINGER & JASON L. DAVIS, UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA SECURITY RESEARCH 
PROJECT, 2002 NATIONAL RETAIL SECURITY SURVEY FINAL REPORT 13 (2003), available at http://www.pitnet. 
com/nrss_2002.pdf. In 2002, an academic study found that about 41% of retail employers use credit history as 
a screening measure for new employee hiring. Id. 
 162 See Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1603. 
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an individual’s control that may have led to her filing for bankruptcy.163 Third, 
the practice does not take into account that there is no correlation between an 
individual’s ability to manage her finances and the quality of her work in low-
level positions.164 Fourth, the practice has a disparate impact on minorities that 
may run afoul of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.165 Fifth, the practice is 
unnecessarily punitive because it punishes individuals who have already been 
penalized for incurring too much debt. 
1. Credit Reports Are Ineffective Evaluative Tools Due to Inaccuracies 
A consumer credit report is a vehicle that enables lenders to “pierce the fog 
of uncertainty” presented by an unknown consumer.166 Some employers use 
these reports in the hiring process and believe that a credit report provides 
evidence that is reflective of employment practices. Without examining 
whether an individual’s debt or bankruptcy record actually reveals information 
about her competency and integrity, which will be explored later, it is worth 
examining the reliability of credit reports. 
a. Credit Reports Are Unreliable 
Studies of the three major credit reporting agencies by the Consumer 
Federation of America found discrepancies among what each of these agencies 
reported on the same individuals.167 Distressing statistics reveal an 
overwhelming number of credit reporting inaccuracies that call into question 
the validity of using credit reports.168 When comparing the information from 
 
 163 ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP: WHY MIDDLE-CLASS 
MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE 81, fig. 4.1 (2003).  
 164 Robert J. Nobile & Brian Murphy, Rethinking the Use of Credit Histories in the Hiring Process, 17 
NO. 2 HR ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRACTICAL GUIDANCE ART 7, Mar.–Apr. 2011. 
 165 See Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 158, at *2. 
 166 Elizabeth Doyle O’Brien, Minimizing the Risk of the Undeserved Scarlet Letter: An Urgent Call to 
Amend § 1681e(b) of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1217, 1221 (2008). 
 167 See CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., NAT’L CREDIT REPORTING ASS’N, CREDIT SCORE ACCURACY AND 
IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSUMERS 16, 33 (2002), available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/121702CFA_ 
NCRA_Credit_Score_Report_Final.pdf. Currently, the FTC is conducting an eleven-year study mandated by 
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 to evaluate the accuracy and completeness of consumer 
reports. Congress will report the study in 2014. FED. TRADE. COMM’N, REPORT TO CONGRESS UNDER §§ 318 
AND 319 OF THE FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT OF 2003, at 2 (2004), available at http:// 
www.ftc.gov/reports/facta/041209factarpt.pdf (quoting Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 
Pub. L. No. 108-59, 117 Stat 1952, 1999). 
 168 See Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1595. A founder and former CEO of an employment screening 
company admitted, “[t]his is an industry that has delivered historically a very low quality product.” Desmond, 
supra note 156, at 913 (quoting Tal Moise, a provider of background screenings).  
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the three major credit reporting agencies, on average only 24% of the 
information yielded on a single consumer is reconcilable among the credit 
reports.169 Moreover, 25% of errors found among the credit reports were 
significant enough to change a person’s credit score.170 This is not surprising 
considering that credit reports are supplemented with four billion pieces of 
information every month.171 
While it is easy to blame inaccuracies on the overwhelming amount of new 
information, many of the inconsistencies in credit reporting are due to the 
credit reporting agencies’ carelessness.172 For example, a credit bureau 
routinely collects data from courthouse public records, and it may in its course 
of work find that a potential employee named Alex Lopez from Miami, Florida 
has filed for bankruptcy. However, the credit bureau is careless in that it does 
not adequately verify which of the many people living in Miami named Alex 
Lopez filed for bankruptcy before putting this negative information in his 
credit report.173 If an Alex Lopez who is not bankrupt wants to fix his credit 
report, he can contact the credit bureau directly. However, because of the 
“technical accuracy” defense, reporting agencies may not be culpable for errors 
that cost Alex Lopez a job, good credit, and future employment.174 
Under the “technical accuracy” standard, a credit reporting agency must not 
“merely promise that its reports contain factually correct information” for the 
technical accuracy standard to be met, but rather the reports must actually 
contain factually correct information.175 Courts applying the technical accuracy 
standard justify the application of this lesser standard by explaining that it 
promotes cost effective credit reporting.176 But the technical accuracy standard 
cannot be justified when the legislature’s intent is taken into consideration. 
Senator Proxmire, who introduced the Fair Credit Reporting Bill on January 
 
 169 CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., supra note 167, at 25. 
 170 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 52, at 13. 
 171 FED. TRADE COMM’N & BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE 
FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT DISPUTE PROCESS 3 (2006), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/ 
fcradispute/P044808fcrasdisputeprocessreporttocongress.pdf. 
 172 See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE PIRGS, MISTAKES DO HAPPEN: A LOOK AT ERRORS IN 
CONSUMER CREDIT REPORTS 7 (2004), available at 
georgiapirg.org/sites/pirg/files/reports/MistakesDoHappen2004-1.pdf.  
 173 Id. 
 174 See Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1603. 
 175 Cahlin v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 936 F.2d 1151, 1157 (11th Cir. 1991). Other courts have 
argued that the legislative history mandates procedures that assure “maximum accuracy.” Koropoulos v. Credit 
Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 40 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
 176 Heupel v. Trans Union LLC, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1234, 1240 (N.D. Ala. 2002). 
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31, 1969, stated that “[p]erhaps the most serious problem in the credit 
reporting industry is the problem of inaccurate or misleading information.”177 
A technical accuracy standard hardly accomplishes what Senator Proxmire 
intended when he introduced his bill. 
Theoretically, if there is any false information in a consumer’s credit 
report, the consumer is in the best position to remedy the error- the consumer is 
likely to be the most knowledgeable person when it comes to activities that 
may affect that individual’s credit report. Under § 1681 of the FCRA, if a 
consumer contacts a credit reporting agency about any inaccuracies or 
incompleteness found within the credit report, the agency must investigate the 
disputed information free of charge or delete the controversial item.178 
According to the Eleventh Circuit, proving that a credit reporting agency has 
not followed reasonable procedures in repairing inaccuracies requires a 
plaintiff to establish that: (1) the plaintiff’s credit report contains an 
inaccuracy; (2) this inaccuracy is due to the credit reporting agency’s “failure 
to follow reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy”; (3) 
the plaintiff was injured by this failure; and (4) the plaintiff’s injury was 
caused by the credit reporting agency’s inclusion of the inaccuracy.179 The 
Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act and the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act amended the FCRA in 1996 and 2003 to improve reporting 
“maximum possible accuracy.”180 
The 1996 and 2003 amendments, while a step in the right direction, have 
done little to protect vulnerable job applicants. In Neal v. CSC Credit Services, 
Inc., Neal, a consumer, sued CSC, a credit reporting agency, for an entry on 
her credit report that stated that she was “included in bankruptcy.”181 She 
discovered this misinformation after she was denied a position.182 The issue in 
this case was whether CSC Credit Services violated the FCRA by including 
this information.183 Neal claimed that CSC did not maintain reasonable 
 
 177 Jill Riepenhoff & Robert Wagner, Credit-reporting Agencies’ Failure to Address Damaging Errors 
Plaguing Thousands of Americans Prompts Call for Swift Action, THE DISPATCH (MAY 6 2010), http://www. 
dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2012/05/06/credit-scars.html. 
 178 15 U.S.C. § 1681i(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 179 Cahlin, 936 F.2d at 1156. 
 180 Consumer Credit Reporting Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996); Fair and 
Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003).  
 181 Neal v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., No.8:02CV378, 2004 WL 628214, at *2 (D. Neb. 2004). 
 182 Id. at *1. 
 183 Id. 
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procedures to avoid reporting prohibited information.184 However, the court 
held that the information included in Neal’s credit report was “technically 
accurate” and did not violate the FCRA.185 
Neal’s father was the debtor who filed for bankruptcy, but because her 
father’s name was on her car lease, her father’s bankruptcy filing was included 
on her credit report.186 After the court was notified that the credit report 
accurately reflected that a bankruptcy was the cause of the late car payments, a 
point won by using the technical accuracy standard, Neal had the additional 
burden of establishing that CSC had not taken reasonable steps to assure an 
accurate reflection of who filed for bankruptcy.187 For someone who is trying 
to find employment, it is a drain on valuable time and resources to pursue a 
credit reporting agency over the three words of “included in bankruptcy” on a 
piece of paper. But the combination of the prevalence of private employers 
using credit reports to screen job applicants and the majority’s narrow 
interpretation of § 525(b) breathe life into these three words. Without these 
words, Neal and countless others like her will have their employment prospects 
damaged for many years. In short, “if it is true that [a] poor credit history is the 
‘Scarlet Letter’ of [twentieth] century America, then no American consumer 
should have to wear that letter undeservedly” when applying for a job.188 The 
American bankruptcy system is meant to protect against that sort of endless 
stigma. 
b. Credit Reports Are Difficult to Remedy 
Even if an individual learns of an error on her credit report, this discovery 
is in vain because credit reports are currently too difficult to remedy. We care 
about remedying the reports because an adverse report can interfere with 
gaining employment and there is nothing prohibiting private employers’ use of 
the reports. There are no federal statutes directly or indirectly on point 
enjoining employment discrimination on the basis of an individual’s credit 
score or her refusal to consent to the procurement of her credit report for a 
potential employer.189 For instance, an employer can reject a job applicant 
 
 184 Id. at *2. 
 185 Id. at *4 
 186 Id. at *1–2. 
 187 See id. at *4. 
 188 O’Brien, supra note 166, at 1244. 
 189 See Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1603. 
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simply for refusing to authorize the distribution of her credit report.190 The 
only mechanism that provides uniform protection to consumers is the FCRA 
and it does not sufficiently protect consumers from inaccurate credit reporting 
in the employment context. 
Despite this glaring deficiency, the FCRA is meant to protect consumers 
from abusive practices and infringements on their privacy.191 The FCRA 
requires an employer to secure an individual’s authorization prior to obtaining 
a copy of her credit report.192 The FCRA also requires employers to inform job 
applicants if their credit report results in denial.193 This urges creditors to 
combat inaccuracies in their credit reports.194 But the FCRA has proven 
ineffectual in both protecting consumers who have filed for bankruptcy and in 
empowering them to fix inaccuracies in their credit reports.195 A consumer 
who learns of an inaccuracy in her credit report should take this error very 
seriously because an adverse credit report can have an extremely harmful 
impact on future employment.196 For example, in Neal,197 the inaccurate 
inclusion of Neal’s father’s bankruptcy on her credit report led to her being 
denied employment as a teller with financial institutions like the American 
National Bank, First National Bank, and Strategic Air Command Federal 
Credit Union.198 
 
 190 See generally Kelchner v. Sycamore Manor Health Ctr., 305 F. Supp. 2d 429, 437 (M.D. Pa. 2004), 
aff’d, 135 F. App’x 499, 502 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that an employer has the right to terminate an employee 
upon her refusal to authorize a credit check).  
 191 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a) (2006); Adams v. Berger Chevrolet, Inc., 2001 WL 533811, at *3 (W.D. 
Mich. 2001).  
 192 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A). 
 193 Id. 
 194 See Elwin Griffith, The Quest for Fair Credit Reporting and Equal Credit Opportunity in Consumer 
Transactions, 25 U. MEM. L. REV. 37, 38–41 (1994). 
 195 None of the cases that address a consumer making an effort to overcome his credit mention the 
individual’s attempt to employ FCRA mechanisms. See, e.g., Myers v. TooJay’s Mgmt. Corp., 640 F.3d 1278 
(11th Cir. 2011); Burnett v. Stewart Title, Inc. (In re Burnett), 635 F.3d 169 (5th Cir. 2011); Rea v. Federated 
Investors, 627 F.3d 937 (3d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 116 (2011); Leary v. Warnaco, Inc., 251 B.R. 
656, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Fiorani v. CACI, 192 B.R. 401 (E.D. Va. 1996); Pastore v. Medford Sav. Bank, 186 
B.R. 553 (D. Mass. 1995); Stinson v. BB&T Inv. Servs. (In re Stinson), 285 B.R. 239 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002); 
Madison Madison Int’l of Ill., P.C. v. Matra S.A. (In re Madison Int’l of Ill., P.C.), 77 B.R. 678 (Bankr. E.D. 
Wis. 1987). 
 196 Michael R. Guerrero, Disputing the Dispute Process: Questioning the Fairness of § 1681s-2(a)8 and 
§ 1681j(a)(1)(A) of the Fair and Accurate Credit Reporting Act, 47 CAL. W. L. REV. 437, 437–38 (2011). 
 197 See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 198 See Neal v. CSC Credit Servs., Inc., No.8:02CV378, 2004 WL 628214, at *2 (D. Neb. 2004). 
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The FCRA does provide some protection to consumers applying for jobs.199 
Employers must furnish a rejected job applicant with a copy of his or her credit 
report, including a written description of the specific information that was 
detrimental to the job application.200 This is cold comfort when the hurdles for 
correcting inaccuracies are prohibitively high.201 Credit reporting agencies do 
not take inaccuracy claims seriously; they outsource credit report disputes to 
foreign countries that spend too little time evaluating individual claims.202 In a 
severe illustration of how taxing the process for remedying a credit report 
inaccuracy can be, one man fruitlessly disputed the accuracy of his credit 
report for over a year.203 The process exacerbated his depression, and he 
ultimately committed suicide.204 In his suicide note, he commented on his 
struggle with the credit reporting agencies.205 
This is an extreme example, but it demonstrates how frustrating it is that 
the FCRA lacks both adequate protection for job applicants and the means to 
correct credit report inaccuracies. Taking the steps to obtain job applicants’ 
consent and providing incentives to rejected applicants to diligently pursue 
greater accuracy is not a remedy for the fundamental problem with the FCRA. 
The fundamental problem is that the FCRA was not created with the aim of 
regulating the employment industry, nor does it successfully do so.206 With this 
in mind the important question becomes: should employers rely on unreliable 
credit reports for measuring job applicants’ financial responsibility? This 
Comment posits that they should not for two reasons: (1) the FCRA was not 
created to regulate the employment industry; and (2) credit reports have a 
dubious connection to job proficiency. 
 
 199 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §1681b(a) (2006); Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1602. 
 199 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a). 
 200 Id. § 1681b(b)(3). 
 201 See Guerrero, supra note 196, at 438–39. It can also be expensive to remedy credit report inaccuracies, 
since a consumer can only view his credit report free-of-charge once a year. 
 202 Credit reporting agencies outsource credit report disputes to third-party contractors in countries like 
Costa Rica and the Philippines. Id. at 438. This is supported by the facts that credit reporting agencies process 
a minimum of twenty-two claims per hour and it costs agencies about fifty cents per dispute to process. Id. 
 203 Chi Chi Wu, Automated Injustice: How a Mechanized Dispute System Frustrates Consumers Seeking 
to Fix Errors in Their Credit Reports, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 139, 140 (2010). 
 204 Id. at 141. 
 205 Id. Captain John Harrison’s testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, housing, and Urban 
Affairs provides an additional account of how trying to fix a credit report error destroyed a man’s life. The 
Fair Credit Reporting Act and Issues Presented by Reauthorization of the Expiring Preemption Provisions: 
Hearing Before the Senate S. Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 157–59 (2003) 
(statement of Capt. John Harrison, U.S. Army (Ret.)). 
 206 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(b)(2)(A) (2006) (indicating that the FCRA is void of any requirement adapting 
consumer information to the employment context). 
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2. Credit Reports Ignore External Factors 
Another reason why credit reports are an unreliable mechanism for 
measuring an individual’s financial responsibility is that the reports do not take 
into account forces outside of the consumer’s control that affect her decision to 
file for bankruptcy. Therefore, credit reports can be misleading. They give the 
illusion of providing insight into a job candidate’s spending habits and level of 
responsibility when, in reality, credit reports merely impart the “brute 
facts . . . without the reasons” and do not reflect the true causes of 
bankruptcy.207 The three main causes of bankruptcy that account for 87% of 
filings are job loss, medical problems, and family break-up (divorce and 
separation).208 None of these causes are reflected on an individual’s credit 
report. Moreover, there is nothing inherently indicative of the “big three” 
causes suggesting an individual’s irresponsibility or a propensity to steal.209 
But instead of actually learning more about a job candidate, potential 
employers only see numbers and vague words on a credit report that 
incorrectly suggest that an individual is financially irresponsible.210 An 
examination of the “big three” causes of bankruptcy will further call into 
question employer reliance on credit reports to measure a job applicant’s 
value.211 This examination will also strengthen the claim that § 525(b) should 
be amended. 
a. Job Problems 
Job problems are the most prevalent cause of bankruptcy.212 Sixty-one 
percent of households report that their financial difficulties were due to 
problems with unsteady and inadequate incomes before they ever filed for 
 
 207 Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 
53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1425 (2001).  
 208 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163, at 81, fig. 4.1. Other reasons include bad investments, credit card 
overspending, and natural disasters. Id. 
 209 Desmond, supra note 156, at 911–12.  
 210 Id. at 912.  
 211 The reason why the “big three” have not done more to transform the political debate is because these 
findings “ha[ve] been largely eclipsed by the credit industry’s effort to convince Congress and the American 
people that frivolous overconsumption and moral decline are the causes of the increased use of bankruptcy.” 
Jean Braucher, The Two-Income Trap: Why Middle-Class Mothers & Fathers Are Going Broke, 21 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 193, 196 (2004) (reviewing WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163).  
 212 TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE 
CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 105 (2000). 
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bankruptcy.213 Not surprisingly, the stability of the job market is a crucial 
factor affecting an individual’s financial health.214 There has been an increase 
in layoffs since the December 2007 downturn in the economy.215 According to 
the Wall Street Journal, as of 2011, unemployment and underemployment was 
at 16.7%.216 A two-income family is two and a half times more likely to 
experience layoffs than a single-income family from a generation ago.217 
Consequently, increases in bankruptcy filings are not only to be expected, 
but also unavoidable even with the most prudent financial planning.218 
Ironically, families that think they are wise to send both parents into the 
workforce in order to “buffer them[selves] against the terrible wrenches of a 
changing economy,” according to researchers, “have just made themselves 
more vulnerable to those very wrenches.”219 This is because a growing number 
of mothers in the workplace means that the family has lost the security of 
having mothers enter the workplace only when the family is experiencing 
financial difficulties.220 Moreover, having both parents in the workplace 
doubles the likelihood that one or both of the breadwinner’s employment may 
be terminated.221 
Because a recession is an outside force that does not reflect an individual’s 
value as an employee, penalizing individuals for not anticipating an unstable 
economy is senseless. Further, it is a social injustice for employers to use this 
lack of foresight as an indication of financial impropriety. Part of bankruptcy’s 
framework was founded on the principle that “economic failures [were] 
produced by economic forces no more controllable or predictable than that 
visitation by a tornado.”222 Discriminating against job applicant Dorothy 
 
 213 See Katherine Porter & Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. 
REV. 67, 99–100 (2006). 
 214 See id. 
 215 The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reported that over a twelve-month period bankruptcy 
filings rose about 20%. Bankruptcy Statistics, Filings, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. COURTS tbl. F (2010). Since 
the recession began in December 2007, 4.4 million people have lost their jobs. Peter S. Goodman & Jack 
Healy, Job Losses Hint at Vast Remaking of Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2009/03/07/business/economy/07jobs.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 216 Dave Kansas, A World of Worries: Markets Fall, New Recession Feared, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2011. 
 217 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163, at 83.  
 218 See Porter & Thorne, supra note 213, at 99–100. 
 219 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163, at 84 (quoting ROSALIND C. BARNETT & CARYL RIVERS, SHE 
WORKS/HE WORKS: HOW TWO-INCOME FAMILIES ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER-OFF 2, 5 (1996)).  
 220 Id. at 81–82. 
 221 Id. 
 222 Charles G. Hallinan, The Fresh Start Policy in Consumer Bankruptcy: A Historical Inventory and an 
Interpretive Theory, 21 U. RICH. L. REV. 49, 56 (1986). 
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because her farmhouse in Kansas was blown away by a tornado, resulting in a 
chain of events that ruined her credit, is illogical. So, too, would it be 
unreasonable to discriminate against her bankrupt Auntie Em, who is now 
seeking employment in Oz because a seven-year drought caused her crops to 
turn to dust and resulted in her livestock starving to death. 
b. Illness 
Illness is another factor that contributes significantly to bankruptcy filings. 
Illness precipitates about 30% of bankruptcy filings.223 President Barack 
Obama addressed this issue in his 2009 State of the Union Address when he 
said, “We must . . . address the crushing cost of health care. This is a cost that 
now causes a bankruptcy in America every [thirty] seconds.”224 Two million 
Americans who become ill each year must simultaneously file for 
bankruptcy.225 These Americans are predominantly middle-class homeowners 
who went to college and had stable jobs before they were diagnosed with the 
illnesses that triggered their bankruptcies.226 
Individuals who fall victim to the double disasters of illness and bankruptcy 
are not reckless people who are more likely to be irresponsible employees.227 
In fact, three-quarters of debtors who became bankrupt due to medical issues 
had some form of health insurance and thought, like many Americans, that 
they were responsibly planning for unforeseen illness.228 The reality is that 
even those with premier health insurance can suffer staggering out-of-pocket 
expenses.229 Predictably, individuals fare worse if they cannot afford durable 
coverage or their employers do not provide high-quality health insurance.230 
For example, many non-premier healthcare insurance plans only pay for visits 
to primary care doctors, and will not pay for specialists or emergency hospital 
visits.231 
 
 223 A Harvard study of 1,771 Americans in bankruptcy courts nationwide revealed that medical bills cause 
fifty percent of bankruptcies. Elizabeth Warren, Op-Ed., Sick and Broke, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 2005, at A23.  
 224 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, 
2009 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 5 (Feb. 24, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
remarks-president-barack-obama-address-joint-session-congress.  
 225 Warren, supra note 223. 
 226 Id. 
 227 See id. 
 228 Id. 
 229 Id.  
 230 Id.  
 231 See id. Health and Human Service Secretary Mike Levitt pioneered a healthcare program called the 
Utah Medicaid Program that provides only bare bones coverage. Id. 
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When an individual is faced with a serious illness, she may be too ill to 
continue working and lose her job. Losing a job is not just financially 
devastating but it often means losing health coverage.232 Medically bankrupt 
individuals usually qualify for the right to continue their health coverage under 
the Comprehensive Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), a 
form of short-term medical coverage triggered by termination.233 But the 
$1,000 monthly premium for qualifying individuals is often not feasible for 
someone who has just lost her primary source of income.234 
A fairly typical case demonstrates how a diagnosis of a serious illness can 
devastate a family’s finances and send them straight into bankruptcy. Carl 
Sorabella, an accountant, contacted his employer to see if he could modify his 
work schedule after his wife was diagnosed with stage-four lung cancer.235 
Sorabella had worked for his employer for fourteen years, but now wanted a 
more flexible schedule so that he could increase his availability to take his wife 
to chemotherapy and accompany her during medical testing.236 When 
Sorabella first made his rescheduling request, his employer said that she would 
have to fire him.237 In response, Sorabella promised to work nights and make 
up any missed hours.238 His employer told him the following work week that 
his employment would be terminated.239 
Because his company employed fewer than fifty people, the company was 
exempt from related federal laws and thus acted legally.240 As this case 
demonstrates, Sorabella was not inherently a bad employee because his wife 
developed cancer. In fact, Sorabella received a raise months before his position 
was terminated.241 Due to the employer’s termination decision, Sorabella and 
his wife were forced to live off of his unemployment and disability insurance 
while they both struggled to find employment.242 This case demonstrates that 
 
 232 See id. 
 233 MARK A. ROTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW 491–92 (7th ed. 2011). 
 234 See Warren, supra note 223. 
 235 Susanna Kim, Massachusetts Man Fired After Telling Employer His Wife Has Cancer, ABC NEWS 
(July 15, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Business/massachusetts-man-fired-revealing-wife-cancer/story?id= 
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 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. The Family and Medical Leave Act mandates twelve weeks of unpaid leave when an individual or 
immediate family member is diagnosed with a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2006).  
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
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good employees can be labeled as irresponsible due to unfortunate, extenuating 
circumstances. Professor Deborah Thorne observes, “from the point of the 
employer, it simply isn’t a wise business practice—many smart and qualified 
folks are going to be overlooked just because of the economic downturn or 
someone in their family had the misfortune of getting ill.”243 
c. Family Break-up 
Ninety percent of the individuals who file for bankruptcy not only are 
educated, but also qualify as middle class.244 Further, most of these individuals 
are part of a family in which both parents have entered into the workforce.245 
Compared to single-income families a generation ago, these modern two-
income families are twice as likely to file for divorce.246 The sociological 
reasons behind this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this Comment, but 
exploring how divorce and separation lead to bankruptcy further demonstrates 
that a bankruptcy history is not a relevant criterion for making hiring decisions. 
It is conventional wisdom that members of a two-income family tend to 
share expenses and other responsibilities of managing a household. When a 
married couple separates, at least one of the adults often moves out of the 
marital home and finds a new place to live while the remaining spouse is left to 
shoulder the residual financial burden under the lease or mortgage the couple 
co-signed.247 Single parents may find it impossible to pay for separate homes 
with one income when they anticipated paying for one home with their joint 
incomes. The family break-up and additional expenses leave the single parents 
vulnerable to debt and bankruptcy.248 Simply because a couple decides it is in 
their family’s best interest to get a divorce, a decision that may lead to a 
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 245 Id. at 7. 
 246 Id. at 86. 
 247 Evan Bedard, Mortgage Options While Goring Through a Divorce, LOANSAFE (July 20, 2010), 
http://www.loansafe.org/mortgage-options-while-going-through-a-divorce. 
 248 F.H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The Bankruptcy Puzzle, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 187, 201–02, 205–06 
(1998). 
OROVITZ GALLEYS3 8/1/2013 2:53 PM 
2013] THE BANKRUPTCY SHADOW 585 
bankruptcy, does not mean that this information is relevant in evaluating a job 
application.249 
3. Financial Responsibility is Irrelevant to Most Low-Level Positions 
To justify an employer’s consideration of a credit report as a part of the 
hiring process, there should be a nexus between the applicant’s personal 
finances and the job for which the applicant is applying. This nexus 
requirement would apply when an employer is considering an applicant’s 
bankruptcy history. The job candidates who are most likely to be discriminated 
against because of a bankruptcy are individuals applying for low-level 
positions.250 It is these positions where credit history is unlikely to reveal any 
relevant information.251 Wisconsin State Representative Kim Hixton explained 
that an applicant’s credit report is irrelevant to the hiring of a “truck driver, 
librarian or gym employee,” and thus, considering an applicant’s credit report 
for these types of jobs “should be illegal.”252 If a job does not entail the 
handling of cash or expensive assets, employers cannot justify using credit 
reports as a hiring criterion. 
This is demonstrated in a case reported by The New York Times. Kevin 
Palmer had been living in a homeless shelter in Santa Ana, California after 
filing for bankruptcy.253 He was granted an interview for a clerk job at a 
property management company.254 The job entailed transcribing homeowner’s 
complaints.255 The interview went well and Palmer was shown an available 
desk and the people with whom he would be working.256 Palmer explained that 
the job would earn him enough income to get himself back on his feet.257 
Unfortunately, the company’s interest in hiring Palmer disappeared after it 
checked his credit history.258 Because the connection between Palmer’s 
personal finances and his ability to record telephone complaints is too tenuous 
 
 249 See Thorne, supra note 243. 
 250 Nobile & Murphy, supra note 164. 
 251 Id.  
 252 Christine Lagorio, States Propose Limiting Credit Checks by Employers, INC. (Mar. 1, 2010), 
http://www.inc.com/news/articles/2010/03/credit-check-legislation.html.  
 253 Jonathan D. Glater, Another Hurdle for the Jobless: Credit Inquiries, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2009.  
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id.  
 257 Id.  
 258 Id.  
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to merit an extensive credit check, legislation is needed to curb this 
employment practice. 
Representative Jon Switalski, a Democrat who proposed anti-
discrimination legislation in Michigan, called cases such as Kevin Palmer’s 
case discrimination. Switalski emphasized that “if you miss a few payments or 
you have medical debt, your skills as a pipe fitter or an electrician don’t 
diminish.”259 There are various factors such as job problems and illness where 
there is not a causal connection between a job applicant’s bankruptcy history 
and the job for which the applicant is applying.260 Continuing to treat negative 
credit history caused by extraneous factors as a determinative appraisal of a job 
applicant is misguided and injurious. 
4. Screening Out Bankrupt Debtors: A Title VII Disparate Impact Issue 
One of the primary reasons the use of bankruptcy history is injurious in the 
employment context is because it may have a disparate impact on minorities.261 
The disparate impact doctrine applies when an employment criterion is 
“facially neutral” yet has the effect of disadvantaging certain minorities.262 
There is reason to believe that private employers’ use of credit reports as a way 
of screening out bankrupt debtors may have a disparate impact on protected 
classes of minorities.263 Empirically, there is a correlation between adverse 
credit information and an individual’s minority status.264 
In general, certain classes of minorities are more likely to file for 
bankruptcy.265 For example, African Americans are overrepresented in the 
general population of individuals who file for bankruptcy.266 Hispanic 
homeowners are nearly three times more likely to file for bankruptcy than 
similarly situated white homeowners.267 A study in Missouri supported this 
correlation “even after controlling for income, educational attainment, marital 
status, urban residence, the unemployment rate, and other socioeconomic 
 
 259 Id. 
 260 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163, at 84.  
 261 See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609 (1993). 
 262 Id. 
 263 See Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 158, at *2. 
 264 See Neal v. CSC Credit Services, Inc., No. 8:02CV378, 2004 WL 628214, at *2 (D. Neb. 2004); see 
also Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 158, at *2. 
 265 See Klein, Moore & Moss, supra note 158, at *2. 
 266 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, COUNTY AND CITY DATA BOOK 494, 508 tbl. B (1994).  
 267 WARREN & TYAGI, supra note 163, at 159.  
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factors.”268 In short, a private employer who uses a credit report as an 
evaluative tool is not only discriminating against a job applicant because of her 
bankruptcy status, but may also be violating Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act.269 
In the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the Supreme Court 
explained that an employment practice with a disparate impact is lawful if and 
only if it is based on “business necessity.”270 The Court further clarified that 
“good intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment 
procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for 
minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”271 The Court 
looked to congressional intent272 and held that an assessment is forbidden if it 
measures a person in the abstract instead of measuring the person for a 
particular job.273 The Court strongly considered Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act, which is meant to protect racial minorities from employment assessments 
that have a disparate impact on different groups.274 One such employment 
assessment is a credit report.275 
There are no studies to support the contention that individuals with adverse 
credit reports are more likely to be irresponsible or dishonest employees. In 
fact, one study found the connection between credit scores and job 
performance is non-existent.276 Because no empirical evidence exists to 
substantiate employers’ argument that adverse credit reports are indicative of 
 
 268 BRENT KABLER, STATE OF MO. DEP’T OF INS., INSURANCE-BASED CREDIT SCORES: IMPACT ON 
MINORITY AND LOW INCOME POPULATIONS IN MISSOURI 11 (2004).  
 269 See Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1610.  
 270 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).  
 271 Id. at 432.  
 272 The Griggs Court explained: 
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. 
It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in 
the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act, 
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be 
maintained if they operate to “freeze” the status quo of prior discriminatory employment 
practices. 
Id. at 429–30. 
 273 Id. at 436. 
 274 Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006) (detailing the practices that create a disparate 
impact).  
 275 See Employment Tests and Selection Procedures, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N 
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/factemployment_procedures.html.  
 276 See Martha C. White, Employee with Bad Credit Scores Aren’t Less Ethical, TIME, Nov. 15, 2011, 
http://business.time.com/2011/11/15/workers-with-bad-credit-arent-less-ethical/.  
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poor job performance, the practice of using credit reports as an evaluative tool 
raises red flags as to whether this practice runs afoul of Title VII. One credit 
reporting agency, Equifax, has even discontinued furnishing credit reports to 
employers seeking to use this information for employment purposes.277 Studies 
and credit reporting agency behavior indicate that the presence or absence of 
“filed for bankruptcy” on a credit report is not an appropriate criterion for 
hiring decisions.278 
The disparate impact of using credit reports as a screening tool is similar to 
the impact of using criminal convictions as a screening tool.279 The Eighth 
Circuit held that an employer’s refusal to hire individuals with any type of 
criminal record had an adverse impact on minorities and thus violated Title 
VII.280 This absolute bar shifts to the employer the burden of proving that the 
applicant pool is not artificially restricted and that the policy is justifiable via 
the “business necessity” exception.281 Employers have not been able to meet 
that burden. Employers who use criminal records have been sued for negligent 
hiring and the settlement figures average $1.6 million.282 Thus, a policy of 
avoiding criteria that are unduly restrictive can be beneficial to the litigation-
adverse employer and job applicant alike. 
The EEOC has taken the stance that an employer’s use of a consumer credit 
report violates Title VII’s disparate impact provisions if the employer does not 
 
 277 John Ulzheimer, Equifax No Longer Selling Credit Reports for Employment Screening, CREDIT.COM, 
Sept. 22, 2009, http://creditbuildersalliance.org/files/equifax_not_sell_reports_to_employers.pdf. 
 278 See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 192 
(1983).  
 279 See Gallagher, supra note 51, at 1599. 
 280 Green v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290, 1198 (8th Cir. 1975). The Eighth Circuit wrote: 
We cannot conceive of any business necessity that would automatically place every individual 
convicted of an offense, except a minor traffic offense, in the permanent ranks of the 
unemployed. This is particularly true for blacks who have suffered and still suffer from the 
burdens of discrimination in our society. To deny job opportunities to these individuals because 
of some conduct which may be remote in time or does not significantly bear upon the particular 
job requirement is an unnecessarily harsh and unjust burden. 
Id. 
 281 See EEOC Policy Statement on the Use of Statistics in Charges Involving the Exclusion of Individuals 
with Conviction Records from Employment, EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict2.html (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2012). See generally El v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007).  
 282 See EEOC Policy Statement on the Use of Statistics in Charges Involving the Exclusion of Individuals 
with Conviction Records from Employment, EEOC.GOV, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/convict2.html (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2012). 
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have a legitimate reason for relying on such a report.283 Acting chairman of the 
EEOC Stuart J. Ishimaru has openly questioned whether credit reports are a 
good screening device.284 In EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Education, the EEOC 
asserted that an employer’s use of credit histories violates Title VII when it has 
a disparate impact on certain protected classes.285 The EEOC reasoned that 
racial minorities are more disadvantaged than their white counterparts because 
racial minorities are more susceptible to predatory lending, foreclosures, 
unemployment, and health care-related bankruptcies that negatively impact 
credit history.286 
The EEOC further alleges that credit history is “neither job-related nor 
consistent with business necessity because there are more appropriate, less 
discriminatory alternative selection procedures.”287 It is worth noting that 
although the EEOC indicates in its decisions that credit checks by private 
employers are troubling,288 its policies are not always given great deference by 
courts.289 Of course, if the EEOC’s position stands up in court, Congress will 
have to react accordingly. It is arguable whether there is a disparate impact 
claim, but the adverse impact on minorities should prompt congressional 
reform in this field. 
B. Screening Out Job Applicants Who File for Bankruptcy is Unnecessarily 
Punitive 
Bankruptcy reform is needed to protect the sanctity of American 
bankruptcy’s fresh start because it is unnecessarily punitive to condemn people 
for their credit histories and prevent them from obtaining employment to 
revitalize their credit.290 Bankruptcy reform advocates argue that a major 
problem with the current system is that filing for bankruptcy no longer elicits 
shame, a sort of psychological punishment spurred by societal judgment.291 
 
 283 Claims brought by the EEOC have been rejected by courts because of the statute of limitations 
imposed on claims that are found to be discrete acts and not inherent of a hostile work environment. See, e.g., 
EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d 619, 625 (N.D. Ohio 2011). 
 284 See Glater, supra note 253. 
 285 Kaplan Higher Educ. Corp., 790 F. Supp. 2d at 621. 
 286 Nobile & Murphy, supra note 164. 
 287 EEOC v. Freeman, No. RWT 09CV2573, 2010 WL 1728847, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 27, 2010). 
 288 EEOC Decision No. 72-1176, 45 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 960 (1972); EEOC Decsion No. 74-2, 
6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 830 (1973). 
 289 See El v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2007) (finding the EEOC’s 
guidelines unqualified for deference and instead adopting a different standard). 
 290 Nobile & Murphy, supra note 164, at 1. 
 291 Julie Kosterlitz, Over the Edge, 29 NAT’L J. 870, 871 (1997).  
OROVITZ GALLEYS3 8/1/2013 2:53 PM 
590 EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL [Vol. 29 
Senator Chris Dodd has stated that the social stigma of bankruptcy has 
vanished.292 Reform advocates further argue that because people no longer feel 
ashamed when they file for bankruptcy, bankruptcy filings have increased over 
the last decade.293 It cannot be argued that the social stigma of bankruptcy is 
gone when employers use internal hiring policies that discriminate against 
individuals who have filed for bankruptcy. Not only does it appear that the 
stigma is alive and well, but job seekers are tormented by their bankruptcy 
shadow warding any opportunity for a “fresh start.”294 
Allowing employers to use credit report information as an evaluative tool 
punishes bankrupt debtors who are just trying to get back on their feet. As 
previously discussed, the “big three” reasons why people file for bankruptcy 
are employment termination, serious illness, and family breakup.295 Punishing 
individuals who have already fallen on hard times because of external factors 
is unnecessarily punitive and morally repugnant. Moreover, this punishment 
runs counter to the objective of debtor rehabilitation as envisioned by the fresh 
start policy. Part of rehabilitation is discharging debt in the name of “renewed 
economic vigor.”296 It is nonsensical that an individual discharging her 
debilitating debt is doomed to acquire the debilitating bankruptcy shadow in its 
place. A solution is necessary to stop the cycle of joblessness. The best way to 
accomplish this is to limit employers’ access to bankruptcy information, which 
is not only damaging to a job candidate’s application, but also does not provide 
any legitimate insight into the candidate’s qualifications.297 To determine the 
best means of doing so, it is essential to examine how state and federal 
legislators are handling this issue. 
 
 292  Id.  
 293 Id. 
 294 See Ziad Raymond Azar, Bankruptcy Policy: A Review and Critique of Bankruptcy Statutes and 
Practices in Fifty Countries Worldwide, 16 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 279, 289 (2008) (explaining that 
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 295 See supra Part III.A.2.a–.c.  
 296 Howard, supra note 24, at 1088. 
 297 Nobile & Murphy, supra note 164, at 2; Thorne, supra note 243. 
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IV.  STATE AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION IS BEING PROPOSED AND ENACTED TO 
PREVENT THE DISCRIMINATORY PRACTICE OF USING CREDIT HISTORIES IN 
EMPLOYMENT 
A. State Legislation 
The court system is not the appropriate arena to fix the problem of 
employment discrimination against individuals who have filed for bankruptcy. 
The protections provided by § 525(b) and the FCRA are too narrow to allow 
courts to restrict private employer access to adverse credit reports. However, 
the political response has been more successful in protecting job applicants 
from employment discrimination.298 In recent years, state legislators have been 
reacting to their unemployed constituents who have been discriminated against 
because of their adverse credit reports.299 For example, Hawaii State 
Representative Marcus Oshiro explained that the interplay between adverse 
credit and unemployment is “almost like being forever sentenced to debtors’ 
prison.”300 
Currently, seven states have enacted anti-credit-check legislation that either 
bans or limits employers’ access to job applicants’ consumer credit reports.301 
In the 2011 legislative session, twenty-eight states and the District of Columbia 
either introduced or had pending anti-credit-check bills.302 An examination of 
some of the enacted and pending legislation signals not only the gravity of the 
situation, but also the need for uniform reform. To date, California, 
Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Oregon, and Washington have 
enacted legislation either banning or limiting private employers’ use of credit 
report information in hiring.303 Washington was the first state to pass its 
legislation into law on April 18, 2007.304 It was amended in 2011 to limit 
employer access to credit reports unless the job applicant seeks to fill a 
position that is associated with credit.305 
 
 298 Lagorio, supra note 252. 
 299 Id. 
 300 Thomas Frank, Job Credit Checks Called Unfair, USA TODAY, Feb. 13, 2009, at 1A. 
 301 Use of Credit Information in Employment 2011 Legislation, NCSL.ORG (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www. 
ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/use-of-credit-information-in-employment-2011-legis.aspx.  
 302 Id. 
 303 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51tt(b) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-2.7(a)(8) (2012); 820 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. 70/10(a)(1) (2012); OR. REV. STAT. § 659A.320 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.182.020(2) 
(2012); see also NCSL.ORG, supra note 301. 
 304 S.B. 5827. 
 305 H.B. 1733, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2011). 
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In this Subpart, this Comment will primarily analyze the Illinois bill, as this 
legislation shows the strengths and weaknesses of state credit check statutes. 
This Comment will examine Illinois’ Employee Credit Privacy Act (Illinois 
Act) because it has been lauded as a nearly “ideal [credit check] legislation” 
and its provisions have been used as a model for several states.306 
The Illinois Act forbids employers from denying employment to an 
individual because of his or her credit report.307 If a job applicant feels she has 
been discriminated against because of her credit report, she can bring a civil 
action to obtain damages, injunctive relief, or both.308 In addition, the Act 
explicitly awards attorneys’ fees and reasonable costs to prevailing 
plaintiffs.309 Under the statute, a credit check is lawful only if it is an 
“established bona fide occupational requirement of a particular position or a 
particular group of employees.”310 A practice is a “bona fide occupational 
requirement” under the Illinois Act if one of the seven listed exceptions is 
met.311 For the most part, these exceptions are narrow and leave little latitude 
for varying interpretations.312 For example, the Illinois Act gives employers the 
right to use credit reports when an individual applies for a position that entails 
unsupervised access to cash or assets valued at $2,500 or more, access to 
“financial information” or “trade secrets,” or “signatory power” over $100 or 
more worth of assets per transaction.313 
The exceptions listed in the Illinois Act are reasonable for political and 
policy reasons. Without these exceptions, it is unlikely a bill of this nature 
would ever get passed. Further, there are some jobs where an individual’s 
credit may be a useful tool for determining her ability to perform a particular 
task, such as when an employee has access to a substantial amount of business 
assets or cash. Some commentators suggest that individuals with adverse credit 
should not have access to sensitive information because they can trade this 
information for money, but this reasoning is unsupported and is a “slippery 
 
 306 Employee Credit Privacy Act, H.B. 4658, 96th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2010); see also 
Sharon Goott Nissim, Stopping a Vicious Cycle: The Problems with Credit Checks in Employment and 
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 309 Id. 
 310 Id. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. 
 313 Id. 
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slope.”314 Under this rationale, individuals who have filed for bankruptcy 
cannot be trusted around any business asset of monetary value, such as FedEx 
parcels. There is no evidence that an employee who has filed for bankruptcy is 
more likely to engage in theft than an employee who has never filed for 
bankruptcy.315 
The Illinois Act effectively avoids loopholes by listing specific 
circumstances that must be met before an employer can access a job 
applicant’s credit report. If the Act merely stated that an employer needs “an 
established bona fide occupational requirement” without the listed 
circumstances, there would be too much latitude for interpretation.316 Further, 
in specifying a minimum dollar or value amount when a credit report is 
acceptable, the bill establishes a clear standard.317 Also, the fifth exception 
applies to any position where a job applicant has access to confidential or 
financial information.318 This exception addresses one of the most prominent 
employer arguments for using credit reports as a hiring criterion. Such an 
exception imbues banks with the authority to deny individuals employment 
who have filed for bankruptcy or who somehow indicate financial 
irresponsibility. 
One of the most troubling aspects of the bill is found in the fourth 
exception: a satisfactory credit history is a bona fide occupational requirement 
if “the position is a managerial position which involves setting the discretion or 
control of the business.”319 This exception has the potential to be a virtually 
unchecked loophole and could leave many job applicants vulnerable if courts 
do not interpret it strictly. California’s bill also includes an exception for “a 
managerial position.”320 Another problem with the Illinois Act is that it does 
not include banks or financial institutions in its definition of employers.321 
Banks and financial institutions are wholly exempt from discrimination 
regulations against job applicants who at some juncture filed for bankruptcy. 
This type of broad exception undercuts the purpose of the Act by permitting 
entire industries to freely engage in employment discrimination. 
 
 314 Nissim, supra note 306, at 71. 
 315 See supra Part I.B.2.  
 316 H.B. 4658. 
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 319 Id. 
 320 A.B. 22, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
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The Washington and Hawaii bills also allow companies to freely engage in 
employment discrimination.322 For example, the Washington bill gives 
employers enormous latitude to conduct credit checks if they demonstrate that 
doing so is “substantially job related.”323 This vague direction provides too 
much leeway for judicial interpretation. 
California’s bill is broader than the Illinois bill and has fewer exceptions.324 
The only class of employer exempted from it is “certain financial 
institutions.”325 The California bill does not exempt positions including 
signatory power over business assets.326 The California bill was vetoed three 
times by Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger before it was passed.327 Governor 
Schwarzenegger stated, “This measure would . . . significantly increase the 
exposure for potential litigation over the use of credit checks.”328 A 
substantially similar bill was approved by a vote of five to one on June 22, 
2011.329 
Currently, fifty-eight bills have either been proposed or are currently 
pending in the 2011 legislative session to restrict a practice that is 
“discriminatory and unnecessary.”330 Federal action is an alternative means to 
solve the employment discrimination problem. It is preferable to state 
legislation given that the different states will inevitably provide varying 
standards. Therefore, compliance for national companies, for instance, would 
be exceedingly difficult. Below, this Comment will argue that since 
bankruptcy is a federal issue it requires a federal solution. 
B. Proposed Federal Action: Equal Employment for All Act 
The benefit of federal legislation is that certain states would never pass 
state legislation prohibiting employment discrimination by private employers. 
While employment decisions are usually local, regulation of credit checks in 
the bankruptcy context should be federalized because bankruptcies are dealt 
 
 322 H.B. 31 25th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2009); S.B. 5827, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2007). 
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with under federal law. Employment discrimination against debtors is already a 
federal issue pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code.331 Arguably, private employers’ 
rights would be limited by more expansive federal bankruptcy legislation, but 
consumer expectations and overall economic health are overriding factors that 
must be considered. In this Subpart, this Comment will examine proposed 
federal legislation that mirrors the Illinois Act. This Comment will discuss the 
merits of the proposed legislations. Lastly, this Comment will appraise whether 
this legislation is likely to pass and what initiatives are necessary to protect 
debtors from employment discrimination. 
Proposed federal legislation is similar to state laws in states like Illinois and 
California.332 The Equal Employment for All Act (EEA Act) restricts when an 
employer can use credit reports as a hiring tool.333 A private employer may use 
a credit report when evaluating a job applicant if the job entails a “supervisory, 
managerial, professional or executive position at a financial institution” or if 
the job requires national security or FDIC clearance.334 Commentators praise 
the exceptions in EEA Act for “strik[ing] an ideal balance between reducing 
harmful effects of the credit check and maintaining financial security of 
institutions.”335 This bill avoids overly broad assumptions about individuals 
who have filed for bankruptcy while allowing certain employers to use this 
information when appropriate. 
The EEA Act strives to prevent employment discrimination by limiting 
employers’ right to request job applicants’ consumer credit reports.336 The 
impetus to pass the EEA Act came from the negative effect the economic crisis 
has had on job applicants.337 These victims of the economic crisis are already 
 
 331 See 11 U.S.C. § 525 (2006).  
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 333 H.R. 321. 
 334 Id. 
 335 Nissim, supra note 306, at 75. In July 2009 Representatives Steve Cohen and Luis Gutierrez co-
sponsored the EEA Act to address failings in the FCRA. Equal Employment for All Act, H.R. 3149, 111th 
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feeling the hardships of financial instability. Having a bankruptcy shadow trail 
them as they attempt to get back on their feet only compounds the problem. 
While the bill was not passed into law during the 2009 to 2010 congressional 
session, Representative Steve Cohen reintroduced the bill on January 19, 2011 
in Congress’s current session.338 As of March 23, 2011, the EEA Act was 
under the review of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer 
Credit.339 Because the EEA Act must pass through the House and Senate, it 
will face scrutiny, which may weaken the bill if it is eventually passed. 
The EEA Act states in pertinent part: “a prospective employer . . . may not 
use a consumer report . . . or cause a consumer report . . . to be procured with 
respect to any consumer where any information contained in the report bears 
on the consumer’s creditworthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity for 
employment purposes.”340 If the EEA Act becomes law, this limitation on 
employers cannot be waived by a job applicant’s authorizing the procurement 
of her consumer credit report.341 The EEA Act lists certain exceptions where 
an employer can use a consumer report if an individual is applying for a high-
level position at a financial institution or is seeking employment with certain 
government agencies.342 An excepted employer must still conform to other 
sections of the FCRA mandating disclosure and notification when adverse 
action is taken because of the information found within the report.343 
Some commentators have criticized the EEA Act for including overly 
narrow exceptions.344 Critics suggest that non-financial firms whose employees 
manage money should be included in the list of exempt employers.345 This 
would include retail stores or call centers where credit card information is 
given over the telephone. Small businesses are major opponents of the EEA 
Act. Small businesses claim that they are especially vulnerable to employee 
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fraud.346 By not allowing adverse credit history as a bar to employment, small 
businesses argue that they become more vulnerable to employee theft.347 Not 
only small businesses, but also private employers, find the EEA Act, at least in 
its proposed form, problematic. Employers also argue that there is a correlation 
between how an individual manages her own finances and her ability to 
manage the finances of her employer, and thus the potential employer should 
have access to such information.348 This Comment has shown this argument is 
unsupported.349 
To pass the EEA Act, pioneers of this reform will have to overcome 
misconceptions about the causes of bankruptcy and the relevance of a 
bankruptcy filing to job qualifications. Public awareness is paramount to 
triumph over the bankruptcy shadow. The vicious cycle of bankruptcy can only 
be stopped when credit reports are used in a way that reflects the value of the 
information they provide. As it stands, credit reports have been used, and 
continued to be used, by private employers for an unintended purpose. It is 
time to pierce the veil of the credit report’s perceived, yet unsubstantiated, 
value to private employers and amend § 525(b). 
CONCLUSION 
In Greek mythology, Sisyphus is punished for eternity to carry a boulder to 
the top of a mountain only to watch it roll back down and start this task 
again.350 The Gods chose this fate for Sisyphus because “they had thought with 
some reason that there is no more dreadful punishment than futile and hopeless 
labor.”351 Job seekers who have gone through bankruptcy are punished 
similarly. They struggle to apply for jobs with the promise of a “fresh start,” 
but like Sisyphus, they realize their efforts are futile and have no choice but to 
repeat this struggle. 
Private employers, who are increasingly using credit reports to disqualify 
job applicants who have filed for bankruptcy, precipitate a problem that must 
be addressed. While passage of the EEA Act would ensure that individuals 
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filing for bankruptcy are not victims of employment discrimination,352 the EEA 
Act was buried during the last congressional session, and it is likely that 
Congress will continue doing so in perpetuity. Individual state laws are a 
temporary solution, but most of the states’ enacted laws provide too much 
latitude for interpretation. This leaves the jobless in the same precarious 
situation they were in before the state law was passed. The jobless are 
repeatedly punished and must continue to fruitlessly apply themselves when 
there is only a slight chance of succeeding. 
Reforming § 525(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, as one commentator has 
proposed, is the most practical means of protecting job seekers who have filed 
for bankruptcy.353 Section 525(b) should be amended so that individuals 
applying for private sector positions are treated the same as those applying for 
government jobs. This would require adding a mere three words to 11 U.S.C. 
§ 525(b).354 The revised subsection should read: 
No private employer may terminate the employment of, deny 
employment to, or discriminate with respect to employment against 
an individual who is or has been a debtor under this title, a debtor or 
bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Act, or an individual associated with 
such debtor or bankrupt, solely because such debtor or bankrupt . . . . 
This reform will undoubtedly lead to treatment of debtors that upholds the 
fresh start theory. If bankrupt debtors are better protected by the language of 
the Bankruptcy Code, employers will demand that the credit reporting agencies 
furnish “clean” bankruptcy reports. Credit reporting agencies will have to 
redact bankruptcy information from credit reports to prevent employers from 
being tarred with bankruptcy litigation claims. Employers and credit reporting 
agencies working together to comply with the amended § 525(b) is a natural 
cycle of responses that will hopefully ameliorate the fresh start problem. 
Resolution of this issue is crucial for another reason. Employers’ use of 
credit histories as an evaluative tool has caused a spike in litigation and 
arbitration.355 This is because of the fact that as employees are becoming 
increasingly vulnerable, disgruntled job seekers have nothing to lose by suing 
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employers who they feel have treated them unfairly. While this area of law is 
in flux, employers should be cautious and take steps to avoid liability. If an 
employer feels that obtaining a credit report is necessary to evaluate a 
particular job applicant, she should be certain that she can demonstrate a strong 
correlation between the applicant’s credit history and the job.356 Employers 
that are financial institutions or that are trying to fill positions that entail access 
to large amounts of cash have stood up in court.357 The EEOC suggests that 
private employers avoid using credit history as a hiring criteria altogether, as 
this practice exposes the employer to liability under the disparate impact 
doctrine.358 This is especially true if an employer is denying an applicant based 
solely on her bankruptcy status.359 
One commentator suggests an alternative solution to the three-word 
addition to § 525(b) of “deny employment to.”360 She proposes that Congress 
change the bankruptcy discrimination test from one that relies on the “sole 
cause” to a “motivating factor” test.361 This proposal does not go far enough. 
The main reason to amend § 525(b) is to prevent employment discrimination 
against bankrupt debtors and provide a fresh start to debtors applying for 
private sector jobs. This would mirror the protection provided to bankrupt 
debtors applying for public sector jobs. The “motivating factor” test does not 
safeguard job applicants applying for private sector jobs. Instead, it offers 
another vague test that requires further case law to clarify what falls within the 
definition of a “motivating factor.” Moreover, augmenting the bankruptcy 
discrimination test entails not only an examination of § 525(b), but also an 
understanding of § 525(a). It is a significantly more complicated initiative to 
amend the entire statute, rather than supplement subsection (b) with three 
words. Further, the recommended remedial provisions are merely a Band-Aid 
for a problem that is comparable to a festering wound. The only solution for 
the bankrupt debtor is for Congress to amend § 525(b) to mirror § 525(a). 
Although public awareness and support from influential administrative 
agencies like the EEOC are critical to reform § 525(b), the most powerful 
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influence for preventing employment discrimination against bankrupt debtors 
is the courts. Looking at the history of how § 525 came into being and how 
Congress showed a willingness to codify Perez, we can see that the courts have 
the power to influence change through their opinions.362 While it is 
understandable for a judge to want to adhere to the letter of the law, it is also 
admirable for the judge to issue an opinion that addresses the harmful effects 
of § 525(b). Hopefully, the culmination of supportive judicial opinions, along 
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